THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT IN THE POLISH SUPREME LAW -- A QUEIXA CONSTITUCIONAL NA LEI FUNDAMENTAL DA POLÔNIA by Szmulik, Bogumil & Poglodek, Andrzej
29Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 1, p. 29-46, jan./abr. 2016EJJL
Abstract: The article presents the institution of 
the constitutional complaint in the 1997 Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Poland. For the first time in 
the history of Polish constitutionalism the current 
supreme law made it possible for the citizens to 
directly appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal in 
order to protect their laws and liberties guaranteed 
by the supreme law. The article describes the origin 
of the institution of the constitutional complaint 
in Europe and in Poland. The main focus, though, 
is on the extended analysis of the scope and covera-
ge of the constitutional complaint, together with 
the conditions set by the legislators that must be 
met for the complaint to be filed. The paper is con-
cluded with the observations on the constitutional 
regulations and the practice of their applications in 
the work of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Keywords: Constitutional Complaint. Constitu-
tional Tribunal. Human Rights. Constitution Po-
land.
Resumo: Este artigo apresenta a Queixa Constitu-
cional na Constituição da República da Polônia de 
1997. Pela primeira vez na história do constitucio-
nalismo polonês, os cidadãos podem postular dire-
tamente ao Tribunal Constitucional a fim de pro-
teger os seus direitos e liberdades garantidos na Lei 
Fundamental. O artigo apresenta a gênese da insti-
tuição da queixa constitucional na Europa e na Po-
lônia. No entanto, a principal atenção foi dedicada 
a análise extensiva do âmbito de aplicação pessoal 
e material de queixa constitucional, e também as 
condições da sua apresentação, estabelecidas pelo 
legislador. O trabalho termina com os comentários 
finais sobre a regulação constitucional e a prática 
da sua aplicação pelo Tribunal Constitucional. 
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Introduction
The constitutional complaint “can be in the most general manner defined as a claim, to 
which an individual in relation to the state is entitled, for the protection of his/her fundamental 
rights in special proceedings before the constitutional court.” (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 1998, p. 
31). Another definition says that 
[…] the constitutional complaint is an institution which may be used by a natu-
ral person or a legal person (both of civil law and public law) in special proceed-
ings before the constitutional court in order to protect his/her fundamental civil 
rights in the case of their infringement by the acts of state authorities or their 
inaction. (WIERZBOWSKI, 1996, p. 209). 
It must be stated that the constitutional complaint is not another appellate measure ex-
tending the course of proceedings for any of the procedures. Legal literature unanimously emphasizes 
that this is an exceptional legal measure to protect constitutional rights and freedoms. The complaint 
is therefore outside the closed systems of ordinary remedies provided by conventional procedures (ad-
ministrative, civil and criminal). The constitutional complaint as an instrument for the protection of 
constitutional rights and freedoms is associated with the European model of constitutional judiciary. 
Genesis of the constitutional complaint should be sought in the circle of German legal culture. The 
term “constitutional complaint” has German roots and was used in legal literature at the beginning of 
the second half of the nineteenth century in the context of the solutions proposed in the draft of the 
constitution of the Reich from 1849 (BANASZAK, 2000, p. 10-11). The origins of the constitutional 
complaint can be traced in Bavaria. In 1814 a complaint was introduced there which could be filed by 
an individual in the event when his rights guaranteed by the Constitution were violated by the act 
of the executive power. Four years later, the newly enacted Constitution of Bavaria granted citizens 
the right to apply to the king in the case of a violation of the Constitution.1 However, it was not a 
constitutional complaint, but a kind of petition (BANASZAK, 2000, p. 10). A proper prototype of the 
modern constitutional complaint appeared only in the Austro-Hungarian Constitutional Act of 1867, 
by virtue of which the Court of the Reich was established to which citizens could apply because of 
the infringement of their constitutional rights (ZWIERZCHOWSKI, 1994, p. 167-168; SCHEUNER, 
1976, p. 23). The complaint, however, could not be applied in relation to legislative acts However, 
as underscored by the Austrian doctrine, in 1867-1918 the Court of the Reich was the only court in 
Europe hearing citizens’ complaints against the violation of their constitutional rights by organs of 
state authorities (including those autonomous).2 In the interwar period the institution of constitu-
tional complaint was in force in Austria by virtue of the Constitution of 1920. Apart from it, another 
country where the institution of constitutional complaint was established was Spain, where the Con-
stitution of 1931 provided for in Article 131 the power of the Constitutional Court to hear appeals in 
1  For more details see Schumann (1983, p. 162).
2  For more details see Czeszejko-Sochacki (1998, p. 12).
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the scope of protection of citizens’ rights if complaints before other authorities remained ineffective.3 
The proper development of constitutional judiciary, and the institution of constitutional complaint 
occurred only after the Second World War. Shortly after the war, the institution of constitutional com-
plaint first appeared in individual West German countries. At first the constitutional complaint was 
introduced in the Bavarian constitution of 1946, later similar institutions were established in 1947 in 
Hesse and only in 1958 in Saarland, to be finally included in the Act of 12 March 1951 on the Federal 
Constitutional Court. As a constitutional institution it has existed since 1969 (ZWIERZCHOWSKI, 
1994; SCHLAICH, 1994, p. 127). In the case of Austria, the restoration of the Constitutional Tribunal 
was provided for by the amendment of the Constitution of October 1945. The next European country 
which introduced this institution in 1978 was Spain. In Belgium the adoption of the institution of 
constitutional complaint was inextricably linked with the slow process of transforming the state into 
a unitary regionalised state (federation) (ZWIERZCHOWSKI, 1994, p. 73). The further development 
and dissemination of the constitutional complaint came with a political breakthrough in Central and 
Eastern Europe, when in the former socialist countries the systemic transformation associated with a 
profound democratization of political systems was launched. The complaint appeared simultaneously 
with the establishment of new constitutional tribunals in the countries such as: Hungary (1989), Rus-
sia (1990), Slovenia (1991), Albania (1992), Czech Republic (1992), Slovakia (1992) and Poland after 
the adoption of the new Constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal Act in 1997.
1 THE PERSONAL SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT
Personal scope of constitutional complaint has been stipulated in Article 79 paragraph 1 of 
the Constitution, which reads: “In accordance with principles specified by statute, everyone whose 
constitutional freedoms or rights have been infringed, shall have the right to appeal to the Consti-
tutional Tribunal [...]” The above Article is essential in the process of identifying the entity entitled 
to lodge a constitutional complaint, or in other words, it gives us a clear answer to the question 
of who can effectively file such a complaint to initiate a proper procedure (although – as discussed 
below – only upon fulfilment of certain conditions) (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 1998, p. 39; SZMU-
LIK, 2006; BAGIŃSKA, 2010). According to Czeszejko-Sochacki (1998), the term “everyone” should 
be understood broadly. As he observes, the scope of the term encompasses both natural persons 
who are citizens of Poland, as well as other persons who are under the authority of the Republic of 
Poland (with certain exceptions for foreigners), stateless persons and legal persons. The rationale be-
hind such interpretation of the term “everyone” is the fact that the Constitution uses it both when 
referring to the constitutional complaint as well as in Article 45 paragraph 1. Given that the both 
institutions have the character of procedural constitutional guarantees, and that the right to lodge a 
constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal can be considered a qualified variant of the 
right to trial, so in the light of the foregoing nothing stands in the way to state that the legislator 
3  For more details see Szmulik Żmigrodzki (2000, p .27).
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gave the term “everyone” the same meaning in the both above cases. The broad understanding of 
the term “everyone” is also possible based on slightly different premises. Trzciński (2002) suggests 
that a reference point for determining the scope of the term should be the objectives which the 
institution of constitutional complaint is supposed to serve as well as the types of violated constitu-
tional rights and freedoms (TRZCIŃSKI, 2002, p. 207; ŁABNO, 2002, p. 773). The fact of including 
Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution in the Chapter on freedoms and rights may suggest that 
the legislator primarily construes the term “everyone” as a natural person. 
Closer analysis of the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution allows even a broader 
interpretation of the term. First of all, in the light of the last assumption, the term “everyone” may 
be used in the sense of a natural person, for instance, in Articles: 41, 42 and 47 of the Constitution. 
Secondly, the interpreted term also covers other entities entitled to use the rights conferred on them 
by the legislature. It is proved by provisions contained e.g. in Articles 45, 63, 77, 78 and 80 of the 
Constitution. These may be, therefore: social organizations, associations, political parties or legal 
persons (GARLICKI, 1996, p. 13). Such understanding of the term “everyone” is dictated by the 
objectives the constitutional complaint serves, i.e. the elimination of unconstitutional acts from the 
legal system, as well as the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights, some of which may be 
also enjoyed by legal persons (e.g. the right to trial, the right to compensate for the injury, the right 
to apply to the Ombudsman). The broad understanding of the term “everyone” is also supported 
by the will of the legislator expressed in votes of the members of the Constitutional Committee of 
the National Assembly. During its sessions, it was decided to grant the right to file a constitutional 
complaint to “everyone” within the meaning of a “subject” of law, in such a way to distinguish 
between the concept of “everyone” and the concept of “citizen”, “every citizen.” During the discus-
sion, the term “person” was also used (TRZCIŃSKI, 2002). Thus, in the light of the foregoing, the 
term “everyone” means a natural person, a citizen or a legal person. In some cases the possibility 
must be taken into account that the institution of constitutional complaint may refer to the pub-
lic authorities. This applies to situations in which their constitutionally protected rights put such 
entities in a situation identical to that of natural persons or other legal persons (CZESZEJKO-SO-
CHACKI, 1998; BANASZAK, 1997, p. 178; WITKOWSKI, 2011, p. 54-64).  Pursuant to Article 79 
paragraph 2 in conjunction with Article 56 of the Constitution foreigners are subject to a significant 
limitation of the use of the institution of constitutional complaint.
2 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT
Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland indicates the scope 
of the constitutional complaint – namely: “a statue or another normative act.” These must be acts 
upon which basis a court or an organ of public administration has passed a final decision on fre-
edoms or rights of the complainant, or in other words, only a normative basis for a final decision 
and not the question of constitutionality of such a decision itself may be a subject matter of a com-
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plaint4. According to Dudek (1998, p. 155), the Constitutional Tribunal does not assess judicial or 
administrative proceedings concluded with a substantive ruling, even if it stated a real infringement 
of constitutional rights of the individual, but norms that enable this infringement, i.e., paradoxi-
cally, “entitle” the authority to issue such a ruling.
The term “statute”, although it is not defined in the Constitution, does not cause serious 
problems with the interpretation of its nature or the procedure of adoption, as well as to its scope. 
Naturally, one may attempt to explain the term even more accurately, in particular with regard to 
its scope. It is not entirely clear whether the legislator using the term understands a statute within 
the meaning of the act called in this manner and adopted by the legislative authority, or perhaps, 
every act which has the force of statute. As we should think, the problem is explained in Article 91 
of the Constitutional Tribunal Act, saying that “[…] whenever in the provisions of the Act the term 
‘statute’ is used, it shall denote statutes and other legislative acts issued on the basis of provisions 
that were binding prior to the entry into force of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, enact-
ed on 2 April 1997.” Therefore  Repel (2000, p. 86) rightly observes that this regulation is different 
from that contained in the previous Constitutional Tribunal Act. The inclusion of legislative acts 
passed under the previous constitutional provisions in the scope of the constitutional notion of 
statute certainly reinforces the point that no act having the force of statute expressly provided for 
in the provisions of the Constitution in force may be left outside this scope. Also legal acts of the 
force of statute, i.e. regulations having the force of statute by the President of the Republic of Poland 
issued pursuant to Article 234 of the Constitution, all previous legal acts of the force of statute (if 
they are still in force), namely:
a) regulations of the President of the Republic of Poland having the force of statute from 
the interwar period; 
b) decrees by the Polish Committee of National Liberation;
c) decrees having the force of statute passed by the government between 1945-1952; 
d) decrees of the Council of State from 1952-1989 are subject to control by the Consti-
tutional Tribunal.
Apart from statute, Article 79 paragraph 1 indicates “other normative act” as a subject 
matter of a constitutional complaint. In this case the extent of interpretation may be large. The 
term “other normative act” may denote any other – excluding, of course, statute - normative act 
setting legal norms (in a broad sense), but it can be also interpreted on the basis of Article 188 
points 1-3 of the Constitution, and therefore it would cover only international agreements and 
normative acts of central state bodies (in a narrower sense) (LABNO, 2002, p. 775). The current 
Constitution, compared to the previous practice of establishing local law and the attendant views, 
adopted new understanding of local law (for more, see Article 87 paragraph 2 in conjunction with 
4  For more details see Bichta and Szmulik (2003, p. 38-410).
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Articles 184 and 241, paragraph 7 of the Constitution). Firstly, it relates it to the activity of some 
local stakeholders, local public administration (local government and local organs of government), 
and secondly, grounds of merit, and especially the personal scope of application of the act and not 
the kind or form of the act play a decisive part in declaring it universally applicable.5 Therefore, one 
should opt for a broader understanding of the term “other normative act”. The view expressed by 
Rymarz, Kręcisz and Zakrzewski should be adopted, who, referring to ratio legis of the constitution-
al complaint, and mainly to the guarantee function in the protection of constitutional rights and 
freedoms, believe that in essence there are no reasons to eliminate local law acts from the scope of 
the complaint (REPEL, 2000, p. 96; NIEZGÓDKA-MEDKOWA, 1997, p. 19). Rymarz (1999, p. 7) 
rightly emphasizes that 
[…] it is difficult to reasonably assume that the legislator establishing the ins-
titution for the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights would, at the same 
time, restrict this protection only to the control of constitutionality of the law 
enacted by central state bodies and assume the exclusion of examination of the 
constitutionality of an important segment of universally binding law in a given 
area, i.e. local law.
In interpreting Article 188 Section 5 it is not difficult to notice that this provision refers to 
regulations contained in Article 79 paragraph 1, and therefore the term “other normative act” used 
therein has an autonomous meaning. The interpretation aiming at the exclusion of local law from 
the scope of constitutional complaint would lead to the serious limitation of the principle of su-
premacy of the Constitution in the system of sources of law, as it assumes that there may be sources 
of universally binding law which contain general and abstract norms that are not subject to control 
in terms of compliance with the Constitution (REPEL, 2000, p. 8). Finally, it should be assumed that 
acts of local law can be subject to control by means of constitutional complaint. 
Also ratified international agreements will fall within the scope of constitutional com-
plaint as in fact there are no grounds for excluding ratified international agreements from this 
scope (REPEL, 2000, p. 92). Furthermore, the exclusion of ratified international agreements from 
the scope of constitutional complaint that today often concern the sphere of rights and freedoms 
of the individual, form his legal position to no less extent than domestic law. Hence, the exclusion 
of the possibility of submitting a constitutional complaint against them would considerably reduce 
the effectiveness of the national system of human rights. Similarly, the scope of constitutional 
complaint includes, issued on the basis of an international agreement, legal acts of an international 
organisation of which the Republic of Poland is a member. This applies in particular to universally 
binding law in the form of secondary law enacted by an international organization.
An important issue that must be addressed here is a matter of acts that cannot be subject 
to control under a constitutional complaint procedure. The exclusion of the possibility of chal-
lenging provisions of the Constitution itself through a constitutional complaint does not raise any 
doubts. Here the case of provisions of the Act to amend the Constitution will be different. The pos-
5  For more details see Ochędowski (1991) and Rot (1996, p. 53).
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sibility of challenging its provisions through the constitutional complaint should be allowed, how-
ever only in relation to an improper procedure of its adoption. Besides, according to the doctrine, the 
admissibility of constitutional complaint is excluded, insofar as it is directed against (DUDEK, 1998, 
p. 157): 1) the failure of the legislative authority to issue an act implementing constitutional rights 
and freedoms, 2) inaction of a court or public administration authority in considering an individual 
case concerning constitutional rights and freedoms, 3) the use of an unconstitutional or illegal act 
in the decision, not having the form of a judgement, or in the decision resulting in a real violation of 
the status of the individual, but actionable, 4) the use of an act or a provision in compliance with the 
Constitution but with its incorrect interpretation in a judgement or decision. It is not permissible 
to challenge the absence of a provision,6 nor file a constitutional complaint against acts devoid of 
the characteristics of normative acts (LABNO, 2002, p. 777)7 as well as entire acts whose provisions 
would constitute a basis for determining a specific case (POLAND, 2002a).
The subject matter of a complaint may be the infringement of rights and freedoms guar-
anteed in the Constitution.8 At the root of the introduction of constitutional complaint laid the 
desire to ensure the observance of constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals, while its form 
of a specific legal measure, not used before common courts, was, first of all, a result of the historical 
development of sources of law, binding courts by statutes and the lack of tradition in the direct 
application of the Constitution by courts. Undoubtedly, also the concepts of constitutional funda-
mental rights, their protection as well as the model of constitutional judiciary played an important 
part here (TULEJA, 1997). In the case of the current Constitution analysis of regulations demon-
strates that the provisions formulating rights and freedoms as a basis for a constitutional complaint 
should be primarily searched for in Chapter II (the freedoms and rights of citizens) and Chapter I 
titled “The Republic”, which sets out the rules of the political system. For this purpose reading the 
preamble and ratified acts of international law regulating the norms of rights and freedoms of per-
sons and citizens would not be without significance here (TRZCIŃSKI, 2000, p. 57). Of course, not 
all principles contained in Chapter I can form an independent basis for a constitutional complaint. 
Naturally, strictly constitutional principles, such as the principle of sovereignty of the nation or the 
principle of separation of powers, cannot be the basis for the constitutional complaint. On the oth-
er hand, it seems that the principle of freedom of economic activity, as well as the principle of the 
protection of property or the rule of law can be used for that purpose. Of course, the same reference 
to the pure wording of the aforementioned principle, without indicating which and how consti-
tutional freedoms or rights have been infringed, will not automatically launch the proper course 
of proceedings with the application. In such a case it is necessary to delve into the content of this 
principle built by the body of rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal and the doctrine of constitu-
tional law. In other words, the principles of a political system can serve as a basis for a constitutional 
complaint, provided that it is possible to translate them into a legal norm defining rights or free-
6  For more detalis see Postanowienie (1998) and OTK ZU (1998).
7  For more detalis see Poland (1998). 
8  For more detalis see Woch (2011), Wróblewska (2007, p. 38-40) and Czoik (2007, p. 12-16).
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doms of the citizen (TRZCIŃSKI, 2000, p. 58-60). Also certain provisions of the introduction to the 
Constitution may provide the grounds for a constitutional complaint. For instance, the principle of 
subsidiarity or the principle of social solidarity expressed in the preamble which could give the basis 
for a constitutional complaint may be indicated here (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI; GARLICKI; TRZ-
CIŃSKI, 1999, p. 164). The judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska, took 
a similar position on this issue, writing that: “the reference to the ideas expressed in the preamble is 
extremely helpful in solving apparent or real conflicts and contradictions faced by the constitutional 
court. The preamble, in fact, sets the direction for interpreting the substantive provisions of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal often voiced such a position. Thus, for example, in the 
case K. 34/97 it inferred the prohibition on arbitrary law-making from the preamble, proclaiming: 
Freedom, justice, cooperation and dialogue - these are some of the values dis-
tinctly worded in the preamble of the Constitution of 1997 that must provide 
the criteria for the assessment of any action of public authorities, including the 
legislation to implement the principles of the democratic and socially just state. 
(LEWASZKIEWICZ-PETRYKOWSKA, 2002, p. 65). 
Łabno (2002, p. 767-768) can be quoted here who reasonably claims that: “[…] the admis-
sibility of the constitutional complaint is determined by [...] the fact of infringing rights or freedoms 
stipulated in the Constitution, rather than drafting it in its particular passage.”
An essential basis, however, is provided by provisions contained in Chapter II of the Con-
stitution entitled: Freedoms, rights and obligations of persons and citizens. There is a consensus in the 
doctrine that the provisions contained in the part: personal freedoms and rights (these are: the 
right of every human being to have his life protected, the prohibition of torture, the right to per-
sonal inviolability and guarantees of personal security, the right to defense and counsel of his own 
choosing or counsel appointed by the court, the right to a fair public hearing of one’s case, the right 
to privacy, including secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of the home [ the violation may take 
place only for reasons and under conditions specified in the Act], the right of every human being 
to keep information concerning his person secret, freedom of the choice of place of residence and 
sojourn as well as leaving and returning to the country, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom 
of communication, freedom of artistic creation and scientific research, freedom of teaching, the 
prohibition of extradition of Polish citizens and persons suspected of committing a crime without 
the use of force) as well as in the next part stipulating political freedoms and rights (these are: 
freedom of assembly, freedom of association [Articles 58 and 59 governing this freedom should 
be considered together with Articles 11 and 12 which regulate freedom to found political parties 
and trade unions], the right to participate in public life [the right to vote, the right of access to the 
public service based on the principle of equality, the right to obtain information on the activities 
of organs of public authority, the right of legislative initiative, and the right to participate in a ref-
erendum], the right to submit petitions, proposals as well as collective and individual complaints 
to organs of public authority) may give rise to a constitutional complaint. The case of economic 
(social) freedoms and rights is different. Most of them are not addressed to citizens but to organs 
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of public authority. Some of them,9 naturally exhaust the requirements to become the basis of a 
constitutional complaint. Others may be claimed only within the limits specified by statute (see 
Article 81 of the Constitution), while the remaining can be only classified as programmatic norms10 
or those that define objectives of public authority bodies. Disputes regarding the admissibility of a 
constitutional complaint are raised by basing it on the last two types, i.e. the rights the assertion of 
which is limited by the Constitution to the scope specified by statute, and programmatic norms. As 
far as the provisions referred to in Article 81 of the Constitution are concerned, some assume that it 
is not acceptable to use a constitutional complaint to protect these rights. Such a position was also 
expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgement.11 These rights belong to the category of 
rights that can be claimed only within limits specified by statute, therefore, it is the task of the or-
dinary legislator to determine the content and substance of the rights referred to in Article 81. Such 
a view, however, is not compatible with the principle expressed in Article 2 of the Constitution, 
according to which the Republic of Poland is also the country “implementing the principles of social 
justice.” This description, in turn, corresponds to the meaning in conjunction with the principle of 
a social market economy expressed in Article 21 of the Constitution. This means that the Republic 
of Poland is obliged to implement the principle of the social state. Therefore the views denying the 
protection, stemming from a constitutional complaint, of a large part of social and economic rights 
should be considered unjustified as these rights are not inferior to civil and political rights and 
freedoms. Furthermore, without these rights it is not possible to use these rights. Thus, they may 
become the basis for a constitutional complaint.
The same applies to programmatic norms. Trzciński’s (2000, p. 62-63) view must be 
shared who wrote: “In my opinion it can be justified that also programmatic norms, in which some 
economic and social right are comprised, can be infringed and may give a basis for a constitutional 
complaint.” It is because programmatic norms determine the directions and principles of pursing 
policy by the Republic of Poland. It should be conducive to the implementation of programmatic 
norms and may not lead to their elimination, or non-compliance. Furthermore, it can be assumed 
that within each programmatic norm its “core” can be found, a violation of which can become a 
basis for a constitutional complaint. In its judgement, the Constitutional Tribunal pointed out that 
the State has the duty to take steps to ensure adequate financial resources necessary for the imple-
mentation of the constitutional social rights, but at the same time it must take into account the 
economic situation and the need to ensure the conditions for economic development (SCHLAICH, 
1994), and even adjust the scope of implementation of social rights to the economic conditions 
(POLAND, 2001). According to the Constitutional Tribunal the limits of possibility of satisfying 
the needs are determined by other protected constitutional values, such as a budgetary balance 
9  For instance, Article 64 paragraph 1: “Everyone shall have the right to ownership, other property rights and the right 
of succession”, or Article 65 paragraph 1: “Everyone shall have the freedom to choose and to pursue his occupation and to 
choose his place of work.”
10  For instance, Article 68 paragraph 1: “Everyone shall have the right to have his health protected” and paragraph 5 of this 
Article: “Public authorities shall support the development of physical culture, particularly amongst children and young per-
sons.”
11  For more detalis see Poland (2000, p. 513).
38
Bogumil Szmulik, Andrzej Poglodek
Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 1, p. 29-46, jan./abr. 2016 EJJL
(POLAND, 2002a). Hence, one has to agree with the Trzciński who does not reject the possibility of 
fully founding a constitutional complaint on these provisions12 indicating three situations “where, 
as long as programmatic norms are violated, the constitutional complaint would be admissible” 
(LABNO, 2002, p. 769). It would be the case if: 1) the legislator adopted a faulty interpretation 
of a provision of the Constitution, where a specific purpose or task of a public authority has been 
defined, or applied incorrect measures for implementing a statute causing the violation of rights 
or freedoms; 2) the legislator enacted restrictions on rights or freedoms that violate the essence 
of these rights or freedoms; 3) the legislator regulated rights or freedoms below the ”minimum” 
resulting from the essence of these rights or freedoms. This position is justified because otherwise 
the citizens could be deprived of one of the mechanisms of influencing the implementation of such 
a policy by public authorities that leads to the implementation of programmatic norms contained 
in the Constitution. The same conditions of the admissibility of a constitutional complaint can be 
adopted for the rights contained in Article 81 whose scope of implementation is defined by statutes. 
However, in our opinion, there is another reason for a constitutional complaint, because in the case 
of the rights listed in Article 81, the reduction of the existing level of the assertion of the rights listed 
there by the legislator, thus the deterioration of their compliance level, should also give a basis for 
the complaint.
The legislator explicitly excluded in Article 79 paragraph 2 of the Constitution the rights 
set forth in Article 56 of the Constitution (the right of refuge and granting a status of a refugee) 
from the scope of a constitutional complaint. Such an explicit exemption is justified, because it is 
difficult to consider that someone might be entitled to the right to refuge or a claim for granting a 
refugee status as to the subjective right. In addition, a person seeking refuge or a refugee status is 
not a citizen of the Republic of Poland, or (if located on its territory) it is not lawful. It is therefore 
difficult to assume that in the case of the denial of the right to the person who illegally entered the 
territory of the Republic of Poland, or his residence permit has expired or it has been withdrawn, 
such a person could claim his rights through a constitutional complaint, the result of which would 
be his stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland.
2 GROUNDS FOR LODGING A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT
The commented provision also indicates grounds for lodging a constitutional complaint. 
The first such prerequisite is an infringement of constitutional freedoms or rights. In Polish the term 
“infringement” (naruszenie) in the colloquial sense means: “take something from the whole; broach 
[...] damage, spoil, disrupt [...] violate, break (e.g. the laws, regulations).” (MALY, 1995, p. 479). Gen-
erally speaking, the term is used to describe any adverse change. In our case, however, we refer it in 
accordance with Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution to the infringements of constitutional 
rights and freedoms, “in a situation where a final judgement (decision) of a court or an organ of 
12  Form more detalis see  Trzciński (1999), Warszawa (1999, p. 44-45) and Trzciński ((1999, p. 10).
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public authority is based on an unconstitutional normative act.” (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 2000, 
p. 68; JAROSZYŃSKI, 2007, p. 26-38). As noted by Czeszejko-Sochacki (2000), the Polish doctrine 
basically has not developed the definition (for the institution of constitutional complaint!) of the 
term “infringement.” However according to Jakimowicz (2008, p. 12, 14): 
[…] infringement of constitutional rights and freedoms must be based on a court 
or public administration decision, and cannot be a consequence of any other fact 
than the implementation of legal norms that are contrary to the Constitution. 
The prerequisite for the admissibility of a constitutional complaint is also the 
direct nature of the infringement of public rights actually felt by the subject of 
those rights. There is no possibility of lodging a complaint against statutory ru-
lings having the nature of general clauses. The protection of public rights through 
a constitutional complaint is admissible in a situation where the limitation of 
constitutional rights and freedoms arises directly from a statute or any other nor-
mative act (inconsistent with the Constitution), and not as a result of passing an 
individual act of a constitutive nature. The criterion of directness, however, will 
be preserved when for the implementation of a statute passing an individual act 
is necessary, but this will be an act of merely declaratory nature. 
However, it is not in every case that the inconsistency of an act of a lower rank with 
the Constitution gives rise to a constitutional complaint. This requirement is fulfilled when the 
infringement of rights results in the deterioration of the citizen’s legal situation in relation to that 
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Thus, filing a constitutional complaint would be unaccept-
able if it appears that a statute or other normative act, although it is inconsistent with the Basic 
Law, does not adversely affect the legal situation of the person concerned. This regulation basically 
distinguishes the constitutional complaint from actio popularis, emphasizing at the same time the 
individual character of the protection guaranteed by it (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 2000; JAROS-
ZYŃSKI, 2007, p. 14).
The second constitutional prerequisite that allows the use of the institution of consti-
tutional complaint to which the commented provision refers is the use of other procedural legal 
measures that enable a review of a final decision passed in an individual case. This means that one of 
the most important conditions for a constitutional complaint is the principle of subsidiarity (PREIS-
NER, 2000, p. 106).13 This is the substantive premise. This principle is founded on the assumption 
that a complaint procedure may be launched only when the complainant had tried all procedural le-
gal means which would have allowed the review of a final decision in a particular case (see Article 79 
paragraph 1 of the Constitution) (LABNO, 2002, p. 779).14 In other words, the principle of subsidiar-
ity refers to the fact that proceedings before the constitutional court are not a continuation of other 
proceedings. Therefore it is required that first all available remedies to which the entity is entitled 
are used and the ordinary course of the proceedings is exhausted. The legislator, in turn, does not 
require that the complainant exhausts political or economic measures at his disposal. On the other 
hand, the principle of subsidiarity cannot be employed everywhere where the entitled entity cannot 
13  For more detalis see Sarnecki (1998, p. 22-23), Sokolewicz (1997, p. 53) and Sokolewicz (1998, p. 53).
14  For more detalis see Warmke (1993).
40
Bogumil Szmulik, Andrzej Poglodek
Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 1, p. 29-46, jan./abr. 2016 EJJL
take advantage of others, except for the constitutional complaint, remedies or where the concept 
of the ordinary course of the proceedings does not apply. Such a situation may be exemplified by 
inaction of the legislator or a complaint against a statute (BANASZAK 1997, p. 268). Thus, also the 
Constitutional Tribunal treats the complaint as an exceptional, subsidiary and extraordinary pro-
tection measure. [...] The essence of the constitutional complaint is its extraordinary and subsidiary 
character. The complaint may be launched only when the complainant does not have any proce-
dural possibility of further proceedings before a court or organ of public administration in his case. 
Courts and organs of public administration are primarily established to adjudicate on individual 
cases, and the Constitutional Tribunal should intervene only after the exhaustion of all procedures 
to settle the case that may be initiated by the complainant himself. This is the essence of the condi-
tion for a “final judgement,” formulated in Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. Against such 
a judgement no further means of appeal or any other legal remedies are available to the complainant 
[...] (POLAND, 1998c). As regards the term “final decision” it should be stated that it encompasses 
an obligation to apply all possible remedies in a particular case, and thus also a cassation appeal or 
a complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court. Only after exhausting these possibilities, in the 
case of an unsatisfactory “final decision,” a constitutional complaint may be filed.
The constitutional legislator did not specify in the Constitution the deadline for filing 
a constitutional complaint. The issue is defined in the Constitutional Tribunal Act. According to 
the Article 46 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act,15 a constitutional complaint can be submitted 
after trying all legal means, if such means is allowed, within 3 months from delivering the legally 
valid decision to the complainant, the final decision or other final judgement. The prerequisite for 
the admissibility of a constitutional complaint is its submission within the time limit. This term 
is of fixed and peremptory character. However, it does not run in the event when the complainant 
requests the appointment of an advocate or legal counsel ex officio until the court considers the ap-
plication. 
The Constitutional Court Act provides that a complaint must:
a) define the subject matter of control - a provision of a statute or other normative act 
on the basis of which a court or organ of public administration has made a final de-
cision in respect of freedoms or rights or obligations of the complainant specified in 
the Constitution, and in respect of which the complainant seeks the confirmation of 
non-conformity to the Constitution;
b) indicate which constitutional freedoms and rights and in what manner have, accor-
ding to the complainant, been infringed;
15  In this article, we refer to the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015, as amended, without taking into account the 
so-called “judgement” of 9 March 2016, as it was not issued by the bench and in manner provided by law. For more on this 
subject, see Szmulik (2016).
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c) justify the alleged non-conformity of the subject matter of control with the indicated 
constitutional freedom or right, with the presentation of arguments or evidence to 
support it;
d) present the facts and:
e) prove the date of service of the judgement, decision or other resolution;
f) indicate whether against the judgement, decision or other final resolution an extraor-
dinary remedy has been lodged.16 
The complaint must also be accompanied by: 
a) judgement, decision or other resolution passed on the basis of a provision which is the 
subject to control by the Constitutional Tribunal;
b) judgements, decisions or other resolutions confirming the exhaustion of all legal me-
ans;
c) special power of attorney.17
The legislator also provided for in Article 66 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act the requi-
rement that the complaint must be drawn up by an advocate or a legal advisor. In this respect it 
may raise some objections from the perspective of conformity to the Constitution. It seems that in 
such a situation, if a person intending to file a complaint requests the appointment of an advocate 
or a legal advisor ex officio, a lawyer should be appointed in each case. Otherwise, it may restrict the 
citizen’s access to the institution. 
There are also three conditions which must be fulfilled in order to allow a constitutional 
complaint to be considered. According to the legal doctrine, the infringement of rights or freedoms 
by an act of public authority must be: personal,18 current and direct (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 
2000, p. 78; CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 1998, p. 42).19 in relation to the complainant. There is an ex-
ception to the “personal” requirement in a judicial decision of the Constitutional Tribunal. Namely, 
in the judgement of 24 January 2001, file reference: Sk 30/99, the Constitutional Tribunal deemed 
lodging a constitutional complaint by the couple acceptable and reasonable in a situation where the 
challenged provision was applied in relation to one of them as a taxpayer, and in relation to the oth-
er as spouse of the taxpayer (POLAND, 2002b). The personal infringement occurs if there is a joint 
fulfilment of the two conditions. First, the complainant is the addressee of a legal norm, secondly, 
due to the existence of circumstances provided for in this norm rights or obligations relating to him 
personally are created. The current infringement shall “refer to [...] situations where the challenged 
act or action applies in a binding manner to a legal situation of the complainant at the time of lodg-
16  In this case, the Constitutional Court may stay the proceedings until the case of the measure (Art. 68 ustawy o TK).
17  Art. 65 ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym
18  Jurisprudence TK knows, however, derogation from this rule. 
19  For more detalis see Benda (1991).
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ing a complaint.” (CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, 2000). The purpose of this criterion is to prevent the 
extension of a constitutional complaint in order to differentiate it from the popular complaint (actio 
popularis), for most of statutes are created with the thought that everyone sooner or later will be-
come its addressee. Thus, it has to be proved that the infringement of fundamental rights is current 
– as far as normative acts are concerned – that their adverse impact on the complainant’s legal situ-
ation is actual rather than potential. The last of the three requirements, i.e. the direct one generally 
relates to normative acts on the basis of which judicial or administrative decisions has been made. 
In other words, the direct impact (resulting in the admissibility of a constitutional complaint) takes 
place when obligations or other burdens on a legal situation of the entity are created by a normative 
act and no other individual acts must be passed.
The Constitutional Tribunal may issue a temporary decision on suspending or withhol-
ding a judgement in a case to which the complaint refers, if the execution of the sentence, decision 
or other resolution could bring irreversible effects for the complainant or if an important public 
interest or important interest of the complainant justifies it. The decision must be immediately 
delivered to the complainant and a competent authority. The Tribunal repeals a temporary decision 
if the reasons for which it was issued expire but no later than on the date of issuing the final jud-
gement in the complainant’s case. If the Tribunal states that a normative act or a part thereof is in 
non-conformity to the Constitution, a temporary decision expires after 3 months from the date of 
its entry into force.20
Conclusion
The institution of constitutional complaint as a legal protection measure that allows ci-
tizens to defend their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution appeared in Poland for 
the first time with the adoption of the current constitution. The legislator adopted, however, a 
narrow, compared with other countries of Central Europe, model of constitutional complaint. In 
Poland, the constitutional complaint is the right serving only those whose constitutional freedoms 
or rights have been violated. Thus it cannot have the nature of actio popularis. To file a constitutional 
complaint, the citizens have to exhaust all administrative and/or judicial means provided by law. 
It causes that the path leading to the use of this instrument for the protection of citizens’ rights is 
longer. A reason for adopting the narrow model of constitutional complaint in Poland was the fear 
of flooding the Constitutional Tribunal with citizens’ complaints. Currently, constitutional com-
plaints are basically considered by seven judges of the Tribunal, but in some cases they can be trans-
ferred for consideration by the Constitutional Tribunal sitting in full bench. The hearing is held no 
sooner than three months from the date of the delivery of the notice on the date of the hearing to 
participants in the proceedings, and if the complaint is transferred to be examined in full bench, no 
sooner that six month from this date. These terms may, however, be halved by the President of the 
20  Art. 68 ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym.
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Constitutional Tribunal in the case of complaints which concern direct infringement of freedoms, 
rights and obligations of persons and citizens laid down in Chapter II of the Constitution. In the 
case of the Tribunal sitting in a bench of seven judges, a judgement is rendered by a majority of 
votes. If the case is transferred for consideration by full bench, two-thirds majority vote is required, 
with the quorum of at least thirteen judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. The solutions contained 
in the Act allow for prompt consideration of constitutional complaints. Unfortunately, practice 
shows a relatively long time of examination of these cases by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Unfortunately, more extensive use of this measure of human rights protection is impeded 
by the strictness of the existing legal regulations concerning the formal requirements to be met by 
the person lodging a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal. This is compounded 
by the practice of the Tribunal itself which very rigorously approaches the complaints lodged, as 
a result of which most of them are rejected in the preliminary examination procedure. As a conse-
quence a constitutional complaint in its present form cannot be regarded as an effective instrument 
for the protection of human rights. Its effectiveness is also reduced by the limitation of the scope 
of some social rights guaranteed by statue. Proceedings in the cases of constitutional complaint are 
regulated in detail in the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015 (Journal of Laws of 201 No. 
1064, as amended) and the resolution of the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of 15 September 2015 on the Rules of the Constitutional Tribunal (M. P., n. 823, 2015). 
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